Tradução da Margarida.
Primeiro tentaram pôr o povo contra as F-FDTL, para provocar as F-FDTL, esperando que as F-FDTL reagissem e MATASSEM o máximo possível. O facto de algumas pessoas de repente espalharem RUMORES que até 100 pessoas podiam ter sido mortas em Tasi Tolu em 28 de Abril não foi uma coincidência. Foi planeado. Ao desacreditarem as F-FDTL, não haveria mais ninguém para proteger a democracia e a Constituição. Para os que tentaram impor a sua vontade anti-democraticamente, as F-FDTL são um obstáculo e continuam a ser um obstáculo para eles até hoje, e é por isso que apelaram a que as F-FDTL fossem desarmadas, desmanteladas, ou pelo menos os comandantes que NÃO COOPERAM demitidos.
Agora a GNR representa o mesmo OBSTÁCULO. A GNR estava pronta para prender Alfredo Reinado mesmo quando o Presidente KRXG discordava, mesmo quando as forças armadas Australianas o protegiam. Para esta gente, isto é inaceitável. Assim espalham os rumores de que a GNR plantou a evidência na residência (onde estava) o Reinado, que a GNR tinha gente de Lospalos, que a GNR não é neutra e que a GNR deve sair de Timor-Leste. Mas nada disto resultou. Por isso agora QUEREM PÔR AS PESSOAS CONTRA A GNR! Com esperança de que a GNR reaja e faça um banho de sangue, para que a GNR fique desacreditada e seja despachada para Portugal.
Estamos a lidar com gente capaz de sacrificar vidas inocentes para servir as suas ambições e objectivos.
ACORDEM!!!
.
sexta-feira, agosto 18, 2006
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"We are dealing with people who are ready to sacrifice innocent lives to serve their ambitions and goals."
This is absolutely true but is misdirected. It should be directed at Mari's clique.
On April 28 there were hundreds of fully operational police in Dili. As an institution, PNTL was fully intact and operational. Nevertheless, only a small number was sent to the government building knowing fully well that they would be unable to fully control hundreds of people demonstrating there.
The government's true intention and plan was to allow an unrully situation to develop as justification for the real use of force that was to follow. This is the only explanation as the police force had not been used to its full
potential and therefore the claims that they could not control the disturbances were untested and false.
With the burnings of cars and damage to the government buildings, the conditions were set to justify the use of military force. This was a common tactic employed by the indonesian forces in Timor when they infiltrated clandestine youth demonstrations and provoked trouble that would justify the intervention of security forces to repress the demonstrators.
That very same day Mari Alkatiri set up a "crisis team" which curiously did not include Rogerio Lobato, then Minister of Interior responsible for the police, and promptly decided to call in the army without satisfying all legal requirements necessary for an army intervention on matters of internal security.
If that was not serious enough, Mari Alkatiri and his "crisis team" overlooked one major factor that would later set the course of the conflict. By sending in the remaining army composed overwhelmingly by soldiers of the EAST against the so called "petitioners" overwhelmingly from the WEST of the country, Mari was (even if unintentionally) substantiating the view that this was indeed an EAST-WEST issue which had just been escalated to the highest level of confrontation through the use of lethal military force.
Faced with this new development that saw an "eastern" army crush the group of "western" ex-soldiers, the remaining westerners in the regular army and in the Military Police which so far had remained above the conflict also split along the east-west divide. These defections were in turn a major development in the turn of events, the possibility of which was also grossly overlooked by Alkatiri and his "crisis team".
This division was by far the biggest contributing factor for the subsequent splits in the Police force and amongst the civilian populations which paved the road to the spread of sectarian violence and anarchy that engulfed Dili.
As we can see the course of history could have been very different had the army never been called upon to intervene of matters that were never of their competence, let alone called upon in a manner contrary to the laws in force.
As tentativas de desacreditar a GNR em curso uma vez mais mostram que o jogo de xadrez continua até serem "abatidas" todas as peças-chave. Um dos principais atores políticos, o antigo PM, Mari Alcatiri, foi um dos alvos a abater, o qual foi afastado das primeiras fileiras políticas nem que seja temporariamente ; as tentativas de menoscabar o FRETILIN com vista a afastarem-no ou fazerem perder o próximo escrutínio não pararão, a institição de segurança, a PNTL, está quase ou totalmente inoperacional, as F-FDTL, como forças legítimas da defesa da soberania e as suas chefias estão submetidos a uma humilhação pertinaz e ameaçados de serem quase acusados pelos crimes de guerra, e nem o sistema de justiça "escapou" às interferências alheias nem que fosse através da nomeação do Procurador-Geral sem qualificações para o cargo, já que não era possível alterar a lei penal; e agora a GNR,essa pedra no sapato. Na base de que lei ou com que pretexto os três jovens detidos pela GNR foram postos em liberdade pelo PG mesmo antes de passarem as 72 horas detidos, nem que fosse para receberem alimento e banho e revigorassem as forças para poderem regressar a actividades favoritas? Não terá o PG dessa forma dito à GNR que está a "marinbar"-se para o trabalho das forças de segurança e que está completamente desinteressado em que as ruas da capital sejam despejadas de lixo?
Além da GNR constituir presentemente um obstáculo, sê-lo também futuramente numa força policial heterogénea em que essa mesma heterogeneidade e diferenças culturais e disciplinares dificultam a uniformidade na actuação, e sê-lo também na generalidade das forças policiais e militares na nova missão em que já temos o auto-proclamado chefe.
De facto, os Timorenses farão sozinhos a cama em que se deitarão!
Em Entrevista ao Expresso de 24.06.2006, disse a Ministra Ana Pessoa:
Expresso - A Justiça está em condições de funcionar em Timor-leste?
Ana Pessoa - Depois de tomar o controlo das forças de defesa e segurança, a Austrália e a Nova Zelândia vão querer controlar a Justiça. É aliás um problema antigo. Quando eu era ministra da Justiça, era a Nova Zelândia que tomava conta das cadeias. A uma dada altura, mandei fazer uma inspecção, porque me chegaram rumores de irregularidades.
Brindaram-me com um motim de reclusos, que se verificou depois ter sido orquestrado para comprometer o Governo.
Os neozelandeses retiraram-se e depois de muita guerra e muita intriga, Portugal ficou encarregue deste sector e da Justiça. Quando deixei a pasta, já tínhamos assinado todos os protocolos de cooperação, para a formação dos magistrados, etc.
Mas há quem não veja com bons olhos esta presença portuguesa e faça tudo para obstruir a aprovação das leis, do Código Penal.
Agora, os australianos desembarcaram com polícias, investigadores, magistrados. Vão querer tomar conta da Justiça e depois da Administração Pública.
Se isto acontecer, será o fim da independência e da soberania de Timor. Não se enganem: há uma estratégia por detrás disso. Fizeram exactamente a mesma coisa nas ilhas Salomão. A pretexto da luta contra os bandos, jogaram a polícia contra os militares e conseguiram por no poder o Governo que queriam. O problema é o tempo, que é curto, e temos menos de um ano até as eleições.
Aqui está o que realmente se passa em Timor.
Pena é que os timorenses não se apercebam da gravidade da situação e continuem preocupados apenas com os ódiozinhos internos.
Uma grande falta de visão!!
A GNR só pode ser uma força absolutamente temível, capaz de pôr o mais pintado em sentido.
Como é que cerca de 120 homens conseguem por tanta gente transtornada? Ou será gente que se transtorna com coisa pouca?
Ou será que alguém não vê que se trata de representatividade e não de numerosidade?
Nao se trata de representatividade ou de numerosidade! Trata-se de se ter "colhoada" para se por os pontos nos iiiiiiiiiiiiiiis!
Com uma simples letra como a letra "i" podem expressar-se tantos estados emocionais e intelectuais, como a surpresa, a alegria, a incredulidade, a ingenuidade, a defesa, etc...
Mas, mesmo que se queira por o ponto no iiiiiiiii.... aparece sempre alguma notícia que nos faz não duvidarmos do "i", mas sim do ponto, por mais bonito que se deseje esse ponto final para se poder passar para a letra seguinte.
"I" como inicial de irredimível e irredutível quando se lê a notícia sobre o adiamento da resolução da ONu sobre a nova missão e os esforços erguidos pelas potências, ou o clube anglo-saxónico mais um membro adjunto, o Japão, designadamente: " a ONU deve apenas concentrar-se "nos papéis que pode desempenhar" e deixar a parte militar entrgue às actuais forças no terreno, lideradas pela Austrália"", entre outras partes bastante relevantes.
"I" como a inicial de "insossar", "insosso" e "insonte" ou sem culpa para quem não consegue ver!
"On April 28 there were hundreds of fully operational police in Dili. As an institution, PNTL was fully intact and operational. Nevertheless, only a small number was sent to the government building knowing fully well that they would be unable to fully control hundreds of people demonstrating there."
My dear Ed, Paulo Martins, on orders from "someone", deliberately sent in an inadequate number of police to control the demonstrators. The police also allowed many of the demonstrators to bring in molotof cocktails and other weapons. This "someone" wanted to "teach" Marii Alkatiri a "lesson." An expensive "lesson" that cost dozens of lives and at least 150,000 refugees in IDP camps.
On the theory that FRETILIN was planning to launch a violent coup is just plain rubbish. FRETILIN had control of the Parliament and the government. FRETILIN had access to the Petroleum Fund. And the next election was at least one year away.
Instead of using violence, FRETILIN could use its powers to "buy" votes in the next election. With the power in Parliament, FRETILIN could draw as much money as possible from the Petroleum Fund to spend in the 2006/7 fiscal year, providing free school, free meal, accomodation, free health care, new infraestructure (road, hospital, schools, etc.), increase salary of the public servants, you name it. This would not only bring in lots of badly needed service to the electorate, but it would also create thousands of jobs. This would pump millions of dollars into the economy boosting the economy into a levels comparable to the UNTAET period. If you notticed, these types of spending are on the Marii's government budget for 06/7 anyway. Marii pledged to grow the economy from a negative growth to 9% in just one year. This came about not as a coincidence. Marii was preparing the ground for the 2007 elections. This type of strategy occurs in every democratic country in the west. This is also the strategy of modern political parties: they are market driven electoral machines.
By 2007 election, these policies will have been implemented bringing in a false sense of prosperity and security among the electorate. The electorate will have FRETILIN to thank for and FRETILIN will certainly have won a much greater majority. The fact that the number of seats in the parliament will be reduced from 88 to 55 to 65, would also put a lot of pressure on smaller parties, making FRETILIN virtually unchallenged and East Timor a virtual one party state, for the next five years. This certainly would have many East Timorese elites contemplating on ways to get rid of FRETILIN, even through violent means. And they most definitely did it. So the plans to split the FFDTL began to take shape, starting with a group of FFDTL soldiers complaining of east/west discrimination and their desertion; Xanana giving them his tacit support; petitioners rejection of various attempts to resolve their grievances, even to readmiting them back to the force, the protest that ended in violence, desertion of Alfredo Reinado, attack against unarmed FFDTL soldiers by Reinado, attack on FFDTL HQ in Tasitolu then in Dili, desertion of Paulo Martins, break down of PNTL, distribution of PNTL armoury, murder of unarmed police officers, murder of Rogerio Lobato's family, accusations that FRETILIN's leadership is illegitimate, burning, looting and murder in Dili even after the international force had arrived as a way of pressuring the government to step down and the parliament dismissed hence handing complete power to Xanana, you name it.
What we must ask in the end is, at what cost?
“My dear Ed, Paulo Martins, on orders from "someone", deliberately sent in an inadequate number of police to control the demonstrators. The police also allowed many of the demonstrators to bring in molotof cocktails and other weapons. This "someone" wanted to "teach" Marii Alkatiri a "lesson." An expensive "lesson" that cost dozens of lives and at least 150,000 refugees in IDP camps.”
Exactly my point!! That “someone” was Rogerio Lobato in accordance with the plan to create a reason to call in the troops. As for the lesson being taught, I was under the impression that it was in fact Mari who thought he was going to teach the petitioners a lesson when he set the army upon them. And to aggravate the matter he did it in contravention of the laws in force.
”On the theory that FRETILIN was planning to launch a violent coup is just plain rubbish. FRETILIN had control of the Parliament and the government. FRETILIN had access to the Petroleum Fund. And the next election was at least one year away.”
Again these were important points considered by Fretilin which lead to the plan they devised to delay the 2007 elections. Let take a closer look shall we.
Although Fretilin had control of Parliament and government they had less than one year in power. The current situation in the country was such where people were living in far worse conditions since the withdrawal of UNTAET’s mission. There was increased poverty and the higher unemployment rate creating a lot of frustration in the people. In general there was a lot of public discontentment at the living conditions in the country.
The livings conditions had to be substancially improved in order for the people to regain confidence in Fretilin’s government. To deal with that, as you correctly pointed out, Mari increased the state budget substancially in order to provide some very visible improvements for the people to see.
There was however a huge obstacle to such an increased budget and one that has been aflicting Timor for as long as Timor became independent. That is the low budget execution capacity of the line ministries which results from inadequate levels os skills in the administration and the highly centralised finance system of procurement . The government and the economy itself had been severely impaired in the past 4 years by a very weak budget execution capacity that has resulted in many ministries achieving a less than 50% budget exectution rate with comparatively much smaller state budgets for those periods.
This low capacity would have been much more noticeable with a far bigger budget Mari was proposing for FY2006/07. This means that the government required more time to fully implement the budget in order to achieve the aims of providing visible improvements in the living conditions thus gaining the people’s confidence and boosting Fretilin’s approval rate at the next election.
So something had to be done to push back the election schedule and Mari himself was already warning before the crisis that it was possible that the election could very well be delayed since the prerequisite electoral laws and the electoral comission laws were not in place nor were the logistical preparations for the election on schedule.
However the delaying of the elections could not have been done just at the governments whims. There had to be reasonable grounds on which to base such delay and a situation of instability would create an environment not conducive to free and fair elections which would have to be delayed until as long as nedeed until conditions improved. The presence of a large cache of illegal weapons in the country fits also very well with such plan. The presence of unidentified armed civilian groups around the country is a testament for that.
What was not part of the plan was the way events unfolded after the incident of April 28 in Tasitolo. The government did not foresee the reaction of Alfredo and other army majors that saw the situation get out of it’s control. The infamous claim that Alfredo had ambushed “unarmed” F-FDTL soldiers has long been exposed by David Oshea’s coverage of the incident. Similar to the Santa Cruz massacre that took place in 1991, Alkatiri’s government were oblivious to the fact that an SBS journalist was in position to record that alleged “ambush” by Alfredo on “unarmed” soldiers. The film of the gunfight that ensued proves beyond reasonable doubt that the government’s claims were a fabrication and that not only the F-FDTL soldiers were not unarmed but they also caused casualties on Alfredo’s group.
Other unplanned developments were the breakdown of the PNTL but this was more an unintended consequence of the April 28 incident in Tasitolo. Given that the F-FDTL had been reduced to soldiers that were predominantly from the EAST as the result of the bulk dismissal of the solldiers from the WEST (petitioners), the Tasitolo incident did not auger well for the “Lorosae-Loromonu” issue. In fact by moving a “Easterner” army against the “Westerner” ex-soldiers, the government gave a new life to the much talked “lorosae-loromonu” division.
If that division had not yet resulted in a generalised high level of animosity between the two groups thus far, that perceived division was gravely escalated when Alkatiri decided to make use of lethal military force. From that moment onwards that division gained a new impetus and it spread uncontrolled like a malignant cancer through the remaining ranks of the security forces with the defection of Alfredo and the other majors and the desintegration of the PNTL along the same east-west devide.
The desintegration of PNTL also affected by other internal issues such as old divisions between “nationalist” police against their collegaues who had served under the indonesian regime, the police comissioner being one of them, and the rivalries between the F-FDTL and PNTL that culminated in the fatal army attack on the Police HQ resulting in the cold blooded murder of unarmed police officers.
On the issue of the “buying” of votes, it could not work as well in a general election as it could in a party congress election. Firstly, the numbers of people involved far far greater and, secondly, there could be not regulation put in place to make people vote by a show of hands. With a secret vote, it would have been virtually impossivel for Fretilin to verify that they were getting in fact what they had “bought”.
So although the form in which this crisis developed was not the way the government intended but it resulted from a plan being played largely in the background to serve Fretilin’s bid to guarantee itself a victory in the next general elections.
HTB
HTB: ainda não percebeu mesmo que as anarqueiradas e confusões só jogam mesmo contra a democracia? Mas vá por mim, jogadas anti-democráticas como as dos peticionários apoiados pela oposição, Ramos Horta e Xanana foram feitas contra a Fretilin, contra o governo da Fretilin, contra o Parlamento Nacional e principalmente contra a Constituição da RDTL. E para substituir o apoio multilateral da ONU a TL por um acordo bilateral cozinhado por Ramos Horta e Xanana que dá plenos poderes aoa militares Australianos sobre a segurança de TL, ao mesmo tempo que mantém a PNTL desarmada e as F-FDTL acantonadas.
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