Why can't military and police just get along?

The Jakarta Post - February 19, 2007
Rizal Sukma, Jakarta [deputy executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies]

I have lost count of how many times members of our security apparatus, the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police, have been engaged in embarrassing clashes. In August last year, a fight between the two forces in Musi Rawas district, South Sumatra, left a soldier and a police officer dead.

In December, a TNI soldier died in a brawl with police personnel in Atambua, East Nusa Tenggara province. The latest incident took place last week in Papua, when a group of seven members of the National Police's Mobile Brigade attacked a military station in Mulia, Puncak Jaya district.

We should not overlook the implications of these fights. TNI and National Police personnel are expected to function as state instruments in providing national security to the whole nation. The TNI functions as an instrument of (external) defense. The National Police maintains public safety and internal security. So, when their members begin to fight, and in some cases even kill each other, this nation clearly has a serious problem.

What is wrong with our security apparatus? The explanations offered by both TNI and police leaders often sound dismissive, if not trivial. The explanation usually begins with the pledge to deliver a "thorough investigation" and take action to "discipline" those responsible. This is then followed by the promise that appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that such incidents will not reoccur in the future. Almost in the same breath, however, they also quickly add that such brawls occur because the security personnel involved are generally young men.

To back up such observations, the explanations are often supported by the fact that the brawls are often triggered by "misunderstandings" over trivial matters. They are also caused by the lack of coordination and communication between the two forces at lower levels on the chain of command. We are also often told that they are nothing to worry about because there is a mechanism in place to deal with the matter. In other words, there is a tendency to play down the severity of the problem, among both TNI and National Police leaders.

A much more interesting and frank explanation, however, was given by Maj. Gen. (ret) Sjamsu Djalal, former commander of Military Police, back in October 2002. He admitted that the clashes between TNI and National Police personnel were often caused by the competition between the two in providing security protection for "partners" (Kompas, October 12, 2002). Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono seemed to confirm this when he commented that one reason behind the clash in Atambua was the problem of welfare. In other words, both police and TNI personnel are forced to moonlight in order to survive.
That is the sad reality this nation needs to reflect upon. This nation asks these young men in uniform to protect both Indonesian citizens and the Indonesian state from any threats. Yet they have no sufficient means of protecting themselves from the threat of economic insecurity. Indeed, it is both a national and international "secret" that our security personnel are under-paid and under-equipped.

However, the problem is in fact much more complex than just the lack of welfare for security personnel. Is it really a lack of funds that causes police officers and soldiers to get involved in fights? A deeper look at the issue reveals a more serious problem than just the question of welfare.

For one, the brawls clearly demonstrate that traces of a culture of violence are still to be found, if not entrenched, in our security forces. People's Consultative Assembly Chairman Hidayat Nurwahid has told TNI and National Police personnel to resolve their disputes in a civilized manner, not by "displaying arrogance and shooting at each other." This clearly requires not only better recruitment, education and training programs, but also new strategic culture .

Second, a major defense review is needed in order to determine the level of the force and budget requirements. For example, we need to know whether the welfare problem in the TNI is really caused by a the small defense budget, or simply by problems in the allocation of funds within the budget. A defense review will also determine whether we really need to maintain or reduce the current force level, especially the total number in the Army.

Third, the problem also relates to the way we deploy our military. We should not dismiss the relationship between the territorial command system (Koter) and the brawls between TNI and National Police personnel. As the tasks of maintaining internal stability and public safety are now in the hands of the police, the Koter system needs restructuring.

Fourth, there is also the problem of the lack of regulations. TNI, while it functions as the main instrument for external defense, it can also be called upon by the political authorities to undertake internal security functions in special circumstances. However, Indonesia does not yet have a law that specifically regulates when and how the military can play such internal security role. It is not enough to control this issue through a ministerial decree or military commander's regulations.

The decision to call upon the military to undertake internal security functions in special circumstances is a political one. It therefore requires a law on "stability and the support role of the military" or "military assistance to civilian authorities" of some sort which will regulate the interaction between the TNI and the National Police.

The writer is deputy executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
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