The Daily Star (Bangladesh) - Saturday, September 8, 2007 12:43 AM
Cdre Md Khurshed Alam ndc psc BN (Retd)
One time mentor and champion of East Timor's sovereignty, Australia, is siphoning off of her oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea in total disregard to UNCLOS 1982.
When Portugal effectively abandoned East Timor, (a colony since 16th century), located on the eastern part of Timor Island on Nov 1975, Indonesia controlling West Timor naturally entered East Timor just like Indian troops marched and occupied Goa in 1961, a Portuguese colony since 1510. Though none raised hue and cry against forcible occupation of Goa, including Portugal, yet she continued to support and train Fretilin separatist guerillas all through the years and predominantly Muslim Indonesia miscalculated the range of activities of the so-called champions of independence.
Following the 1999 violence, Australia led the International Force for East Timor which restored security in East Timor and continued to play a leading role in the follow-on UN peacekeeping missions and had been the front-line support for her transition to independence.
When it was clear that Indonesia's rule in East Timor was breaking down, the Australian government hatched farfetched plans to ensure dominance in the Timor Sea at any cost. The leading role played by Australia in the 1999 UN intervention into East Timor was actually aimed at ensuring that the tiny state remains firmly under Australian financial and military domination. Finally with strong help from Australia, Portugal and other western powers, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste commonly known as East Timor was born in May 2002.
The unstable government in East Timor has always been dependent upon the troops, police and economic aid of Australia, which was provided mainly to exploit the dispute of East Timor's the Greater Sunrise Unit area and Bayu-Undan oil and gas fields and specially Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the Timor Sea.
The position of the Timorese government, led by ex-Fretilin separatist leaders President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, was that the question of the maritime boundary and sovereignty had to be settled as the basis for determining the rights of the two countries. Timorese government requested monthly talks on the sea boundary and a settlement within five years and the Australian government insisted on talks every six months and resolution in 99 years. For obvious reasons known to all, during the recent crisis in East Timor, Australia again responded quickly to the East Timorese government's request for assistance to help stabilise the domestic security situation.
Australia continued to put pressure on the new government of Timor which was facing lots of problems at home, to sign a new Timor Sea Treaty (TST) so as to facilitate Australia's control of the seabed resources. Despite the new government's almost total economic and military dependence on Australia, the then PM refused to sign away its right to negotiate new maritime boundaries. It however had to sign the TST in 2002 “without prejudice” to a final settlement of the sea boundary. At every meeting since then, Australia has blocked any such settlement. Among other things, Australia might have thought that a renegotiated border with East Timor may invite Indonesia to dispute the boundary with Australia established by the 1972 TST. Normally a dispute such as this could be referred to the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for an impartial decision, sudden Australia's unilateral announcement in March 2002, that it would no longer accept maritime border rulings by these UN bodies, underscored the government's real intention as regards to their calculated move towards the oil and gas resources of East Timor. This factor in part also explains Australia's treatment toward East Timorese negotiators and the callousness displayed toward the welfare of the population it claimed to have “liberated” in 1999.
In late 2003, East Timor demanded Australia stop pilfering the Laminaria-Corallina royalties until the boundary issue was settled. However, Australia ignored the request as the field will be exhausted within a few years. Since the field began operating in November 1999, the Australian government has earned about US$ 2 billion while East Timor has received nothing. In 2003 alone, Australia received US$ 172 million in royalties from Laminaria-Corallinatwice as much as the entire budget of the East Timorese government. The most important point to note is that if the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were applied correctly, the international boundary would be along a line equidistant from the land territories and the only fully operating field, the Laminaria-Corallina, would fall entirely under East Timorese control.
Australia maintained that she has been generous in its dealings with East Timor, as it has given East Timor 90 percent of the revenue from the Bayu-Undan field. However, if the UNCLOS rule were applied there as well, East Timor would have been entitled to 100 percent of the revenue from the Bayu-Undan field. Far from being generous, Australia has exploited East Timor's desperate need for revenue from Bayu-Undan to force the special concessions that had to be made over the much larger Greater Sunrise field. Australia stalled the necessary parliamentary legislation allowing the development of the Bayu-Undan until the last minute, threatening the whole project with collapse. This manoeuvre forced the East Timorese government to agree to the proposal of surrendering Greater Sunrise Area.
The East Timorese parliament, in an attempt to maintain some bargaining power, refused to initially ratify it. However, four years of intimidation by the Australian negotiators continued unabated unless East Timor agreed to sign a separate protocol covering the Greater Sunrise field. The latest agreement, however, concedes it under conditions where the Bayu-Undan fields will be exhausted in about 15 years.
The unresolved question of sovereignty also deprives East Timor of any part of the servicing and processing involved with the fields, all of which is now concentrated in the Australian city of Darwin. While there is little infrastructure in East Timor, sovereignty over the Timor Sea resources would have given the Timorese state a say in the rate of exploitation of the fields and led to some transfer of skills and employment. The Greater Sunrise protocol, signed by Australia and East Timor in 2003, and came into force in 2007, now provides the secure legal and regulatory environment required for the development of the Greater Sunrise oil and gas reservoirs. Under the TST, both Australia and East Timor are bound by the treaty to refrain from asserting or pursuing to rights, jurisdiction or maritime boundaries in relation to the other for 50 years.
The two governments have also undertaken not to commence any dispute settlement proceedings against the other that would raise the issue of maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea. Greater Sunrise area is apportioned on the basis that 20.1 per cent falls within the JPDA and the remaining 79.9 per cent falls in an area to the east of the JPDA over which Australia exercises exclusive seabed jurisdiction. This apportionment reflects the geographical location of the resources. Due to the agreed resource split in the JPDA, under this protocol East Timor would receive tax revenues from 20.1 per cent of the Greater Sunrise resource and Australia would receive tax revenues from 79.9 per cent.
According to the maritime experts, this one-sided deal will be worth in the region of an additional billion dollar to East Timor. However, its main consequence is that Australia has succeeded in having East Timorese government drop its claim of sovereignty over key resource-rich areas of the Timor Sea for generations to be commercially exhausted.
Finding no other option from her one-time mentor who helped her to secede from Indonesia, she has now agreed so for a relative peanut, and given that the total royalties from the Greater Sunrise field over its projected life may reach US$ 38 billion, despite the field lying much closer to its territory than Australia.
Under the new agreements, Australia will continue to exercise continental shelf jurisdiction outside the JPDA and south of the 1972 Australia-Indonesia seabed boundary. East Timor will be able to exercise fisheries jurisdiction within the JPDA. A Maritime Commission will also be established to enable high-level dialogue on a range of important issues facing Australia and East Timor in the Timor Sea, including the management of security threats to offshore platforms and cooperation in managing fisheries resources.
It has now been reliably learnt that the claim of the Australian government to have sent thousands of troops to East Timor for purely humanitarian purposes is not true, rather it was a scramble for oil and gas. The signing of the two Timor Gap documents and the presence of 4,000 Australian military personnel in East Timor clearly demonstrates their real mission about the urgency of protecting Australian corporate and strategic interests in the Timor Sea.
Among the most revealing aspects of recent events in East Timor has been the almost complete silence of the Australian media about the two agreements signed by the Australian government to secure control over the multi-billion dollar oil and natural gas reserves beneath the Timor Sea. No headlines, photographs or commentary greeted either signing ceremony or the official announcement in each other's capital. The recent announcement clears the way for a $1.4 billion project in the Bayu-Undan field, which is about 500 kilometres north-west of Darwin, and 250 km south of East Timor.
It is apparent that Australian policy has shifted from being the West's most ardent defender and champion of the right of the Timorese people to self-determination. Even the form of the Timor Sea treaties highlights the colonial character of the new arrangements. The initial signatory for East Timor was the UN Administrator, who held complete power over the former Portuguese colony and the treaties will legally bind any incoming East Timorese government, and in spite of some lukewarm efforts by the Timorese government this was the culmination of more than four years of bullying that the government of Australia finally ensured effective Australian economic and political control of the offshore border region and the wealth beneath its waters.
As for the Timorese masses, in whose name Australia has intervened, they have had no say in the arrangements whatsoever. All in all, the East Timor operation has provided a lesson in the modus operandi of the new “ethical” foreign policy proclaimed by the Western powers as the basis for their interventions. Under the pretext of a sudden concern for the lives and well-being of the refugees and the oppressed, a new colonialism has taken place, driven entirely by thrust for oil and gas revenues as well as other natural resources and strategic advantages. Six years after East Timor's so-called “liberation”, 40 percent of the population still lives on 50 cents a day or less, life expectancy is just 40 years and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world.
Increasing dependence on Australia for food, safety, divided politically and with an economy in tatters, analyst believes that East Timor may be on a path to becoming a failed state. The siphoning off of the lion's share of the region's oil and gas wealth by Australia will perpetuate this suffering for many years to come.
Bangladesh should draw some lessons from the happenings in Timor Sea as we are yet to demarcate our maritime boundary with both Myanmar and India and claim sovereign rights over the gas and oil reserves spreading on an area of about 2,07,000 sq km in the Bay of Bengal.
- The author is a free lancer.
sexta-feira, setembro 07, 2007
Strategic Issues: Australia siphoning off East Timor's oil and gas reserves
Subscrever:
Enviar feedback (Atom)
9 comentários:
Blood for oil? Maldito Mr Coward! A.A.
É bom saber que estas questões timorenses são acompanhadas em países como o Bangladesh e que o jogo sujo da Austrália seja denunciado internacionalmente.
Apenas três pequenos reparos:
"none raised hue and cry against forcible occupation of Goa, including Portugal"
Em 1961, Portugal apresentou um protesto na ONU devido à invasão de Goa, Damão e Diu. Já antes (1955-1960) tinha interposto e ganho uma acção no Tribunal Internacional de Justiça, pela mão do ilustre doutor Inocêncio Galvão Telles, sobre direito de passagem em território indiano (Dadrá e Nagar-Avely). Já então a União Indiana pressionava Portugal, impedindo a livre circulação entre estes enclaves e os restantes territórios portugueses. (http://www.sg.min-edu.pt/expo03/min_01_galvao_teles/expo2.htm)
"yet she continued to support and train Fretilin separatist guerillas all through the years"
Não se percebendo muito bem quem é "she", Portugal nunca treinou guerrilheiros da Fretilin. A Austrália muito menos, pois sabemos muito bem de que lado ela estava.
"The unstable government in East Timor has always been dependent upon the troops, police and economic aid of Australia"
Será que o autor se refere ao actual Governo? Só pode...
Dear Editor,
While rightly denouncing Australia's siphoning off of East Timor's oil and gas reserves (Sept 8) Cdre Md Khurshed Alam's article shows a limited understanding of East Timor's history, in particular Australia's
acquiescence in Indonesia's takeover of East Timor in 1975.
That year, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta wrote that an agreement over
Timor sea oil and gas reserves could be 'much more readily negotiated with
Indonesia than with Portugal or an independent East Timor'.
Australia gave de jure recognition to Indonesia's illegal annexation of East
Timor, and in 1989 signed the Timor Gap Treaty, dividing East Timor's oil and gas reserves between Australia and Indonesia. The then Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, responded to critics by remarking that 'the world is a pretty unfair place'.
The claim that Portugal 'continued to support and train Fretilin separatist [sic] guerillas' is ludicrous, given that the Portuguese were described by
Jos� Ramos Horta, now East Timor's President, as 'pathetic bystanders'. In any event, East Timor was completely sealed off by the Indonesian military.
Cdre Md Khurshed Alam describes Indonesia's invasion of East Timor as 'natural'. Does that make the independence of Bangladesh (and Pakistan) from India 'unnatural'? If East Timor's independence leaders are 'separatists',
then what does that make those of Pakistan and Bangladesh?
Yours sincerely
Ken Westmoreland
- The author is a free lancer.
....which either means he is a mercenary, or doesn't have a job.
Tradução:
Questões estratégicas: A Austrália suga as reservas de petróleo e de gás de Timor-Leste
The Daily Star (Bangladesh) - Sábado, Setembro 8, 2007 12:43 AM
Cdre Md Khurshed Alam ndc psc BN (Retd)
A Austrália que já foi mentora e campiã da soberania de Timor-Leste, está a sugar as suas reservas de gás e de petróleo do Mar de Timor completamente á revelia do UNCLOS 1982.
Quando efectivamente abandonou Timor-Leste, (uma colónia desde o século 16), localizado na parte leste da ilha de Timor em Novembro de 1975, a Indonésia que controlava Timor Oeste entrou naturalmente e Timor-Leste exactamente como as tropas Indianas marcharam e ocuparam Goa em 1961, uma colónia Portuguesa desde 1510. Apesar de ninguém ter levantado gritos e berros contra a ocupação pela força de Goa, incluindo Portugal, contudo continuou a apoiar e a treinar as guerrilhas separatistas da Fretilin durante todos esses anos e a predominantemente Muçulmana Indonésia calculou mal a gama de actividades dos assim chamados campeões da independência.
Depois da violência de 1999, a Austrália liderou a Força Internacional para Timor-Leste que restaurou a segurança em Timor-Leste e continuou a ter um papel liderante nas missões da ONU que se seguiram e tem estado na linha da frente no apoio à transição para a independência.
Quando ficou claro que o domínio da Indonésia em Timor-Leste se estava a romper, o governo Australiano maquinou planos para assegurar o seu domínio no Mar de Timor a todo o custo. O papel liderante da Austráliana intervenção de 1999 da ONU em Timor-Leste na verdade visava assegurar que o pequeno Estado se mantivesse firmemente sob o domínio financeiro e militar Australiano. Finalmente, com a forte ajuda da Austrália, Portugal e outros poderes ocidentais, A República Democrática de Timor-Leste vulgarmente conhecida como Timor-Leste nasceu em Maio de 2002.
O governo instável em Timor-Leste tem estado sempre dependente de tropas, polícias e ajuda económica da Austrália, que foi fornecida principalmente para explorar os disputados campos de petróleo e de gás de Bayu-Undan na área do Greater Sunrise de Timor e especialmente a Área Conjunta de Desenvolvimento de Petróleo (JPDA) no Mar de Timor.
A posição do governo Timorense, liderado pelos ex-líderes separatistas da Fretilin, Presidente Xanana Gusmão e Primeiro-Ministro Mari Alkatiri, era que a questão da fronteira marítima e da soberania tinha que ser arrumada como base para determinar os direitos dos dois países. Mensalmente o governo Timorense requereu conversações sobre a fronteira marítima e uma resolução em cinco anos e o governo Australiano insistiu em conversações todos os seis meses e numa resolução em 99 anos. Por obvias razões conhecidas de todos, durante a recente crise em Timor-Leste, Austrália respondeu novamente rapidamente ao pedido do governo Timorense para assistência e para ajudar a estabilizar a situação de segurança doméstica.
A Austrália continuou a pôr pressão no noco governo de Timor que estava a enfrentar muitos problemas em casa, para assinar o novo Tratado do Mar de Timor (TST) para facilitar o controlo da Austrália dos recursos do leito do mar. Apesar da quase total dependência económica e militar da Austrália do novo governo, o então PM recusou assinar os seus direitos de negociar as novas fronteiras marítimas. Contudo teve de assinar o TST em 2002 “sem preconceito” para uma resolução final da fronteira marítima. Em cada encontro desde então, a Austrália tem bloqueado qualquer resolução. Entre outras coisas, a Austrália pode ter pensado que uma fronteira renegociada com Timor-Leste pode levar a Indonésia a disputar a fronteira com a Austrália estabelecida pelo TST de 1972. Normalmente uma disputa como esta pode ser levada ao Tribunal Internacional de Justiça e ao Tribunal Internacional para a Lei do Mar para para uma decisão imparcial, mas o súbito anúncio unilateral da Austrália em Março de 2002, que não mais aceitaria as decisões sobre fronteiras marítimas destes dois órgãos da ONU, descobriu as verdadeiras intenções do governo vistos como um movimento calculado em direcção aos recursos de gás e petróleo de Timor-Leste. Este factor em parte explica também o tratamento da Austrália em relação aos negociadores Timorenses e a crueldade mostrada com o bem-estar da população que clama ter “libertado” em 1999.
No final de 2003, Timor-Leste pediu à Austrália para parar de roubar as royalties de Laminaria-Corallina até a questão da fronteira estar arrumada. Contudo, a Austrália ignorou o pedido dado que o campo estará exausto dentro de poucos anos. Desde que o campo começou a operar em Novembro de 1999, o governo Australiano já recebeu cerca de US$ 2 biliões enquanto Timor-Leste não recebeu nada. Apenas em 2003, a Austrália recebeu US$ 172 milhões em royalties de Laminaria-Corallina duas vezes mais que o orçamento total do governo Timorense. O ponto mais importante a sublinhar é que se a Convenção da ONU de 1982 sobre a Lei do Mar (UNCLOS) fosse correctamente aplicada, a fronteira internacional seria ao longo da linha equidistante dos territórios de terra e o único campo completamente a operar, o Laminaria-Corallina, cairia totalmente sob controlo Timorense.
A Austrália manteve que tem sido generosa a lidar com Timor-Leste, dado que tem dado a Timor-Leste 90 por cento dos rendimentos do campo de Bayu-Undan. Contudo se a regra do UNCLOS fosse aplicada lá também, Timor-Leste teria direito a 100 por cento dos rendimentos do campo de Bayu-Undan. Longe de ser generosa, a Austrália tem explorado a necessidade desesperada de Timor-Leste dos rendimentos de Bayu-Undan para forçar concessões especiais que teve de fazer sobre o muito maior campo de Greater Sunrise . A Austrália fez encalhar a legislação parlamentar necessária que permite o desenvolvimento de Bayu-Undan até ao último minuto, ameaçando o desmoronar de todo o projecto. Esta manobra forçou o governo Timorense a acordar na proposta que rodeia a Área do Greater Sunrise.
O parlamento Timorense, numa tentativa para manter algum poder negocial, recusou-se inicialmente a ratificá-lo. Contudo, quatro anos de intimidação pelos negociadores Australianos continuaram sem pausa a não ser que Timor-Leste acordasse em assinar um protocolo separado cobrindo o campo de Greater Sunrise. O último acordo, contudo, concedeu sob a condição de os campos de Bayu-Undan estarem exaustos em cerca de 15 anos.
A questão não resolvida da soberania priva ainda Timor-Leste de qualquer parcela dos serviços e processamentos envolvidos nos campos, os quais estão todos agora concentrados na cidade Australiana de Darwin. Conquanto haja poucas infra-estruturas em Timor-Leste, a soberania sobre os recursos do Mar de Timor teria dado ao estado Timorense uma palavra no ritmo da exploração dos campos e levado a atransferência de capacidades e empregos . O protocolo do Greater Sunrise assinado pela Austrália e Timor-Leste em 2003,e que entrou em vigor em 2007, fornece agora o ambiente seguro, legal e regulador requerido para o desenvolvimento das reservas de petróleo e gás do Greater Sunrise. Sob o TST, ambos, Austrália e Timor-Leste estão obrigados pelo tratado a restringirem-se de afirmarem ou perseguirem direitos, jurisdição ou fronteiras marítimas em relação ao outro durante 50 anos.
Os dois governos assinaram também não começar nenhum procedimento para resolver disputas contra o outro que levante a questão das fronteiras marítimas no Mar de Timor. A área do Greater Sunrise é dividida na base de 20.1 por cento cai dentro do JPDA e do restante 79.9 por cento cai numa área a leste do JPDA sobre a qual a Austrália exerce jurisdição exclusiva sobre o fundo do mar. Esta divisão reflete a localização geográfica dos recursos. Devido à divisão acordada de resursos no JPDA, sob este protocolo Timor-Leste receberá rendimentos de 20.1 por cento dos recursos do Greater Sunrise e a Austrália receberá rendimentos de 79.9 por cento.
De acordo com os peritos marítimos, este acordo unilateral valeria na região um adicional bilião de dólares para Timor-Leste. Contudo, a sua principal consequência é que a Austrália conseguiu que o governo Timorense deixasse cair a sua reclamação à soberania sobre áreas chave ricas em recursos no Mar de Timor durante gerações para serem exaustas comercialmente.
Não encontrando nenhuma outra opção do seu há tempo mentor que o ajudou a separar-se da Indonésia, concordou agora a fazê-lo por uma bagatela, e dado que o total de royalties do campo do Greater Sunrise sob a vida projectada pode atingir US$ 38 biliões, apear do campo estar situado muito mais perto do seu território do que do Australiano.
Sob os novos acordos, a Austrália continuará a exercer jurisdição própria fora da JPDA e a sul da fronteira do fundo do mar de 1972 da Austrália-Indonésia. Timor-Leste poderá exercer jurisdição de pesca no interior do JPDA. Uma Comissão Marítima será ainda estabelecida para possibilitar um diálogo de alto nível numa série de questões importantes que a Austrália e Timor-Leste enfrentam no Mar de Timor, incluindo a gestão de ameaças de segurança a plataformas offshore e a cooperação na gestão de recursos pesqueiros.
Soube-se agora com toda a confiança que a afirmação do governo Australiano para ter mandado milhares de tropas para Timor-Leste por razões puramente humanitárias não é verdadeira, pelo contrário foi uma disputa por óleo e gás. A assinatura dos dois documentos do Timor Gap e a presença de 4,000 membros das forças militares Australianas em Timor-Leste demonstram claramente que a sua verdadeira missão era a urgência em proteger os interesses estratégicos das corporações Australianas no Mar de Timor.
Entre os aspectos mais reveladores dos eventos recentes em Timor-Leste tem sido o completo silêncio dos media Australianos acerca dos dois acordos assinados pelo governo Australiano para assegurar o controlo sobre as reservas de petróleo e gás natural de multi-biliões de dólares por baixo do Mar de Timor. Nem Títulos de notícias, fotografias ou comentários saudaram quer a cerimónia de assinatura ou o anúncio oficial nas duas capitais. O anúncio recente abre o caminho para um projecto de $1.4 bilião no campo Bayu-Undan field, que está a cerca de 500 quilómetros a noroeste de Darwin, e a 250 km a sul de Timor-Leste.
É aparente que a política Australiana mudou de ser o mais ardente defensor e campeão do Ocidente do direito à auto-determinação dos Timorenses. Mesmo a forma dos tratados do Mar de Timor põe em foco o carácter colonial dos novos arranjos. O signatário inicial de Timor-Leste era o Administrador da ONU, que tinha poderes completos sobre a antiga colónia Portuguesa e os tratados obrigavam legalmente o governo Timorense que se seguia, e apesar de alguns mornos esforços do governo Timorense este foi o culminar de mais de quatro anos de intimidação do governo da Austrália que finalmente assegurou o efectivo controlo económico e político Australiano da região da fronteira offshore e da riqueza por debaixo das suas águas.
Quanto às massas Timorenses, em nome das quais a Austrália interveio, não tiveram qualquer palavra nos arranjos. No fim de contas, a operação Timor-Leste deu uma lição sobre o modo de operar da nova política estrangeira “ética” proclamada pelos poderes Ocidentais como base para as suas intervenções. Sob o pretexto de uma repentina preocupação com as vidas e o bem-estar de refugiados e dos oprimidos, aconteceu um novo colonialismo, guiado inteiramente pelo impulso por rendimentos de petróleo e gás bem como de outros recursos naturais e vantagens estratégicas. Seis anos depois da chamada “libertação” de Timor-Leste, 40 por cento da população continua a viver com 50 cêntimos por dia ou menos, a expectativa de vida é de apenas 40 anos e as taxas de mortalidade materna estão entre as mais altas do mundo.
Uma crescente dependência da Austrália para comida, segurança, dividido políticamente e com uma economia em fanicos, os analistas acreditam que Timor-Leste pode bem estar no caminho para se tornar um Estado falhado. O sugar da parte de leão da riqueza do petróleo e gás pela Austrália perpetuará o sofrimento durante muitos anos no futuro.
Bangladesh deve tirar algumas lições dos acontecimentos no Mar de Timor porque temos ainda que demarcar a nossa fronteira marítima com Myanmar e a Índia e reclamar os nossos direitos soberanos sobre as reservas de petróleo e gás que se espalham numa área de cerca 2,07,000 km2 na Baia de Bengala.
- O autor trabalha por conta própria.
Russian arms sale makes Australia anxious
By our own reporter
Jakarta, September 6: Indonesia is expected to buy Russian submarines, tanks and helicopters after an agreement for Moscow to provide Jakarta with credit of US$1 billion when President Vladimir Putin makes his first visit to the country today.
Dino Pati Djalal, who is spokesperson for Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has confirmed the agreement but without providing details.
The agreement has sparked anxiety in neighbouring Australia where the Jakarta-based correspondent for the influential Sydney Morning Herald reports that the purchase will include two high-performance Kilo-class submarines.
The correspondent, Mark Forbes – who can expected to have been briefed by Australian diplomats in the Indonesian capital – writes that the acquisition has significant strategic implications for Australia and could erode its naval dominance in the region.
He quotes Indonesian Navy Admiral Sugeng Darmawan as saying that long-term plans to buy another eight of the new submarines were already being discussed.
He also quotes Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre scholar Hugh White as saying the submarines would “significantly complicate” Australia’s naval planning as they would represent a real threat to surface warships.
“These are Russia’s highest quality conventional boats; they would significantly increase Indonesia’s capability,” he said. “It is most strategically significant for Australia; if there was any conflict with Indonesia these submarines would massively complicate the use of Australian surface ships,” he said.
The correspondent does not say why Australia needs naval dominance.
But the Australian occupation of the former Indonesian colony of East Timor and its determination to pipe gas from the Timor Sea to northern Australia rather than have it go to the coast of the newly-independent country could prompt disagreements.
The deep water off East Timor is prized by submariners and Washington’s approval of Indonesia’s occupation of the former Portuguese colony was partly excused because it would deny access to submarines of the then Soviet Union.
Putin will meet with Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during a one-day stop over on his way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Australia.
Indonesia has also bought fighter aircraft from Russia.
The Southeast Asian Times
Right now Australia has submarines and Indonesia have none. That means in places like the Timor trough, the Ombai and Wetar Straits, Australia has supremacy. Their submarines control the subsurface and rule those underseas as if they were theirs. But soon, they might bump into an Indonesian submarine in its own waters. Ouch....you are all of a sudden just another colonail vestage society trying to survive in a racually different region whom you perceive as your inferiors racially and intertnationally. Australia deserves to understand that it is an anomally racially and historically in the midst of a proud and independent bunch of people, but it will never become so enlightened!!!!
The writer is a freelance Australian journalist too ashamed of her own nation's conduct (Australia) to disclose her name.
- The author is a free lancer.
Bengal lancer - chancer. Rhyming slang.
The writer is a freelance Australian journalist too ashamed of her own nation's conduct (Australia) to disclose her name.
Grow up.
Enviar um comentário