Relatório da CI - VI. Conclusions and findings

VI. Conclusions and findings

A. Conclusions

221. The Commission is of the view that the violent events of April and May were more than a series of criminal acts. They were the expression of deep-rooted problems inherent in fragile State institutions and a weak rule of law. The events exposed many deficiencies and failures, particularly in the two institutions at the centre of the crisis, F-FDTL and PNTL, along with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior charged with their oversight. The absence of comprehensive regulatory frameworks and the bypassing of existing institutional mechanisms, even if underdeveloped, contributed significantly to the emergence and growth of the crisis.

222. The Commission believes that the conclusions, findings and recommendations of the present report should not be considered as ends in themselves. Rather, they should be viewed as the foundation upon which the capacity-building and strengthening of State institutions and the rule of law should rest. The Commission hopes that the political leaders of Timor-Leste and the international community will draw from the report in developing strong frameworks, norms and practices of good governance.

223. This conclusion does not detract from the seriousness of the crimes committed during April and May. It is critical to the foundations of the State that persons be held to account for their actions through a process which is both fair and prompt. The Commission is cognizant of the overwhelming desire on the part of the community for justice, which must be fulfilled by an impartial, efficient and credible judicial system. The Commission is of the view that justice, peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing imperatives. If peace and democracy are to be advanced, justice must be both effective and visible. The Commission urges the Government of Timor-Leste to implement its recommendations and asks the international community to support every effort made by the Government in this regard.

B. Findings

224. The Commission finds that:

(a) The Government was insufficiently proactive in addressing the lack of a national security policy and problems evident within and between PNTL and F-FDTL;

(b) The Government failed to follow the requisite legislative procedures in calling out FFDTL on 28 April 2006, a matter for which those members of the Crisis Cabinet who made the decision, and in particular the former Prime Minister, bear responsibility;

(c) F-FDTL had limited preparedness to provide military assistance to the civil power, a matter for which responsibility lies with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force;

(d) The operational planning and response to the violence by PNTL during April and May was deficient, a matter for which the PNTL General Commander and the Minister of the Interior bear responsibility;

(e) No massacre of 60 people occurred at Taci Tolu on 28 and 29 April 2006;

(f) The abandonment of post on 24 May by the PNTL General Commander was a serious dereliction of duty and the Minister of the Interior failed to take sufficient steps to respond to the breakdown in the chain of command of PNTL;

(g) The Chief of the Defence Force cannot be held criminally responsible for the shooting of PNTL officers by F-FDTL soldiers after the ceasefire had been established on 25 May;

(h) The Chief of the Defence Force failed to exhaust all avenues to either prevent or stop the confrontation between F-FDTL and PNTL on 25 May;

(i) There was an absence of systematic control over weapons and ammunition within the security sector, particularly within PNTL. The Commission finds that the Minister of the Interior and the General Commander bypassed institutional procedures by irregularly transferring weapons within the institution;

(j) Both PNTL and F-FDTL weapons were distributed to civilians. In arming civilians, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence acted without lawful authority and created a situation of significant potential danger;

(k) The former Prime Minister failed to use his firm authority to denounce the transfer of security sector weapons to civilians in the face of credible information that such transfer was ongoing and involved members of the Government;

(l) The speech given by the President on 23 March 2006 was perceived as divisive and the President should have shown more restraint and respect for institutional channels by exhausting available mechanisms before giving the speech and by communicating directly with Major Reinado after the latter’s desertion;

(m) The President did not order or authorize the armed group of men under the command of Major Reinado to carry out criminal actions;

(n) Certain individuals are criminally responsible for the incidents of violence during April and May 2006.
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